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That a firm's initial equityholders often emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings 
with more value than the absolute priority rule would suggest is now a generally accepted 
fact.  The form in which this value is distributed, however, is less well understood. In 
particular, why do the original shareholders of some firms emerge from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy with stock in the reorganized firm, while others receive warrants? This essay 
proposes that informational asymmetries provide the answer to this question. By 
proposing a reorganization plan in which they receive warrants, the original stockholders 
of a firm with good future prospects can signal their superior information to the creditors 
in a way that firms with poor prospects will not wish to mimic. 
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That a firm's initial equityholders often emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings 
with more value than the absolute priority rule (APR) would suggest is now a generally accepted 
fact.'  The form in which this value is distributed, however, is less well understood.  Betker 
(1991)  notes  that  securities issued to  firms'  original shareholders during reorganizations are 
virtually always in the form of  new equity or warrants2 In fact, Franks and Torous (1994) show 
that warrants account for, on average, 30 percent of  the total payments made during a Chapter 
11 reorganization to the bankrupt firm's original preferred  stockholder^.^  The purpose of  this 
essay is to answer the question posed by  this fact:  Why do the original shareholders of  some 
firms emerge from Chapter  11 bankruptcy with  stock in the reorganized firm, while others 
receive warrants? 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy law exists to facilitate the reorganization of  the firm as an ongoing 
concern, as opposed to liquidating its assets in a piecemeal fashion4 Because the firm's future 
value is uncertain, its equityholders would like to delay the reorganization as long, as possible; 
if, in the intervening period, the firm's prospects improve, it will be able to pay off its debts and 
the equityholders will retain the residual value of  the firm.  This is the well-known "option to 
See, for example, Betker (1995), Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), Franks and Torous (1991), 
and  LoPucki and  Whitford  (1990). 
This paper was later revised in Betker (1994). 
The breakdown of the payments to common stockholders is not presented. 
This justification  seems well ingrained in the folklore of  the Bankruptcy Code; see, for example, 
Jackson  (1986) and  White  (1990).  Whether it stands up  to  critical analysis, however,  is  a different 
question. 
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the firm's equityholders for giving up this delay option so that they will allow the reorganization 
to proceed. 
The insiders of a firm are likely to have superior information about its future prospects, 
compared to  other participants in the bankruptcy process.  If  this information is favorable, the 
firm's  shareholders would like to credibly convey it to their creditors -  the larger the future 
revenues  of  the  firm  are  likely  to  be,  the  more valuable  their  delay  option.  Conversely, 
shareholders of  a firm with poor prospects would like to hide this information.  By proposing a 
reorganization plan in which they receive warrants, the original stockholders of a firm with good 
future prospects can signal their superior information to the creditors in a way  that firms with 
poor prospects will not wish to mimic. 
Key to our analysis is the fact that the firm's initial stockholders use the reorganization 
process to extract surplus from their creditors.  Brown (1989) models the reorganization game 
implicit in Chapter 11 and shows that APR violations are driven by  the borrower's first-mover 
advantage (the exclusivity period given to the debtor for proposing a plan of reorganization); by 
being able to offer the first plan of reorganization (which is accepted), equity reaps all the gains 
from avoiding further delay.  Bebchuk and Chang (1992) carry this idea one step further by 
allowing the firm to continue running during the reorganization process.  Since there is a chance 
that the fm's ongoing revenues might be sufficient to pay off  its debt obligations, an extended 
renegotiation process provides the above-mentioned option value to the initial stockholders.  In 
this  model,  APR  violations  occur  not  only  because  of  the  delay  costs  avoided in  a  quick 
See, for example, Franks and Torous (1989, 1994) and Bebchuk and  Chang (1992). 
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One by-product of  our analysis is to show how the "clean  slate" of  bankruptcy can be 
used to look at the firm's capital structure decision (in this case, the choice between equity and 
warrants).  It is well understood that tax rules, informational asymmetries, and agency conflicts 
among stockholders, managers, and bondholders are all important factors in determining how a 
firm chooses to  finance its investments.  But a firm cannot ordinarily fully adjust its capital 
structure as these incentives change over time.  In order to optimize in the present, a firm may 
need to undo a decision made in the past (for instance, by buying back old debt or equity it has 
issued).  While this may be feasible in some cases, in others it can be quite costly, and as a 
result, the firm may end up with a hodgepodge capital structure that does not accurately reflect 
its incentives at the moment.  Chapter 11 bankruptcy, however, allows the firm to wipe away all 
its old debts and  stock and  issue wholly  new  securities.  Alderson  and  Betker  (1994) take 
advantage of this idea and show that fm  with high liquidation costs choose post-reorganization 
capital structures that are typically low in debt and that have less restrictive covenant terms. 
In the next section, we outline our basic model.  Following the analysis of Bebchuk and 
Chang (1992), we derive the amount of the firm's value that Chapter 11 negotiations will allocate 
to  its original shareholder (called the entrepreneur) and its creditors.  In section 3, we discuss 
how the specific securities chosen to distribute this value can affect the payoff to each class of 
claimants.  Section 4 concludes. 
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Consider a two-period world in which an entrepreneur/manager is the sole stockholder of 
a firm.  This firm  has cash valued at x,  and debt outstanding with a face value of  6, owed to a 
single lender.  Assume that x,  < 6 so that the firm is in financial distress.  One can think of  x, 
as the realized period-one profits from an investment project the entrepreneur selected in period 
zero, and 6 as the payment required to ensure that the lender earned zero expected profits on a 
loan extended in period  zero.  Assume,  furthermore, that  the firm's  investment project will 
produce a random return i2  in period two. 
While the distribution of i2  is assumed to  be independent of  x,,  in period one the 
entrepreneur learns private information regarding the distribution of i2.  In particular, the firm's 
period-two return may  have one of  two distributions,  G(x2)  or  B(x2), where G is fist-order 
stochastic dominant over B so that G(y) I B(y) ,  Vy, with strict inequality for a set of  values 
of  y with positive probability.  In other words, for any constant y, it is always more likely that 
the realized value of  % will be less than y under distribution B than it is under distribution G.6 
One implication of this assumption is that the expected value of i2  is larger under G  than under 
B.  For ease of  exposition, we will refer to the firm with distribution G  as the "good  firm" and 
to  the  other  as the  "bad  firm."7  Using  standard  notation,  let  g(x2) and  b(x,) denote the 
respective density functions of  the two types of  firms.  Finally, let p be the proportion of firms 
in the population that have distribution G; this proportion is known by the lender, so absent any 
For an introduction to first-order stochastic dominance, see Milgrom (1981) and Laffont (1989). 
Similarly, we  will refer to the "good entrepreneur" and the "bad  entrepreneur." 
4 
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p G(x2) + (1  -p)B(x2). It is easy to show that G is first-order stochastic dominant over Il,  which 
is first-order stochastic dominant over B. 
Since the firm is in financial distress, it must renegotiate with its creditors.  Our model 
of  the Chapter 11 renegotiation process is a simplification of  that developed by Bebchuk and 
Chang  (1992), the  general  structure of  which  can  be  described  as  follows.  A  plan  of 
reorganization specifies the proportion of the firm's existing cash and expected future revenues 
to be distributed to each class of  claimants; a plan is adopted only if every class of  claimants 
accepts it.  It is common knowledge that the firm will be allowed to continue in reorganization 
for n periods, after which, if no plan is accepted, it will be liquidated and the proceeds will be 
distributed according to  the APR.  Default costs of  c are incurred in each period, meaning a 
quick reorganization is more efficient than one that is drawn out.  In the first e periods, the 
debtor is granted an exclusivity period in which to propose a plan of  reorganization.  For the 
remaining n-e periods, each class of claimants has an equal chance of  being allowed to propose 
a plan, with only one plan being offered each period.  During this process, the firm continues to 
operate and receive revenues; none of these revenues, however, may be distributed to any of the 
claimants  until  a  final  plan  of  reorganization  is agreed upon.  The  equilibrium is found 
recursively by  solving the model for the final period and working backward. 
In our model, there are only two  classes of  claimants -  equity and debt -  and we 
assume  that  n  = 2  and  e  = 1.  If  no  agreement is reached  by  the  end of  period  two, the 
bankruptcy cow  imposes the liquidation outcome.  At this point, the firm will have x,  + x2 in 
cash, minus the 2c in default costs incurred during periods one and two.  Let V:  and V:  denote 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9512.pdfthe payoffs to the entrepreneur and the lender, respectively, when no agreement is reached: 
Clearly, each of  these payoffs is simply a direct application of  the APR. 
Knowing this guaranteed minimum outcome, in period two neither the entrepreneur nor 
the lender will accept any plan of  reorganization promising less.  Since costs are incurred and 
no uncertainty is resolved between period two and the court-mandated liquidation, the only plan 
of reorganization either class may propose that will be accepted gives V:  to the entrepreneur and V: 
to the lender.8  Although the entrepreneur and the lender are equally Likely to  be allowed to 
propose a plan in this period, our structure implies that the choice is irrelevant -  both classes 
will offer the same plan, which will be a~cepted.~ 
Moving back to period one, the entrepreneur's exclusivity period, the lender must decide 
whether to accept or reject the entrepreneur's proposed plan of  reorganization.  His expected 
return from rejecting the plan and continuing the process into period two is 
where h = 6 + 2c - xl ,  and  F is the distribution function of the random variable Z2, depending 
on  whether  the  lender  knows  the fm  is  good  or  bad  (in  which  case F = G  or  F = B, 
Note that this is the outcome that would occur if the firm were simply allowed to pay  off its debts 
at any point during the reorganization process in which it was  able.  Thus, there is no loss of  generality 
in assuming that the firm, once in reorganization, must stay in reorganization until it is liquidated or a plan 
is confirmed. 
In a model with more periods, the method in which plan proponents are selected will have an impact 
on the outcome of  the process.  See Bebchuk and  Chang (1992). 
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any reorganization plan that offers him an expected return at least this large.  Therefore, the 
entrepreneur will propose a plan that offers  V,*  to the lender, leaving the remaining expected 
revenue for himself: 
As in Bebchuk and Chang, the (unique) equilibrium of  this model is for the  entrepreneur to 
propose a plan of  reorganization that gives  V,'  to the lender and  V,'  to himself, and for the 
lender to accept the plan.  Although the structure of our model is somewhat different from theirs, 
the entrepreneur's payoff (V,')  is analogous to Bebchuk and Chang's expression (13).  The first 
term is the delay cost avoided by early resolution of  the bankruptcy process, which accrues to 
the entrepreneur because of his first-mover advantage.  The second term is the option value he 
receives because the firm is allowed to continue. This value derives from the fact that the fm's 
future revenues might exceed its current debts. 
Expression  (3)  makes  it  clear  that  the  value  the  entrepreneur  receives  from  the 
reorganization process depends on the lender's beliefs about the firm's type, i.e., the distribution 
of  i2.  Since the good entrepreneur's option is more likely to end up  "in the money," he is in 
a stronger bargaining position than he would be if  his firm were bad.  To take advantage of this 
position, however, he must credibly convince the lender that his firm is, in fact, good.  In  other 
words, the good entrepreneur would like to separate.  Unfortunately, the entrepreneur with the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9512.pdfbad firm would like to pool with the good firm, keeping the lender from differentiating the two. 
These ideas are formalized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1.1:  The entrepreneur of the good firm  can negotiate a  higher expected return 
when his firm  separates than he  can when it pools  with the bad firm. In contrast, the 
entrepreneur of  the bad firm receives a lower expected return when separation occurs. 
Proof:  We will show that the difference between the good entrepreneur's expected return from 
pooling and his expected return from separating is negative: 
where this final step follows from the fact that G is first-order stochastic dominant over n. An 
identical argument shows that the entrepreneur of  the bad firm receives a lower expected payoff 
from pooling. 4 
The next logical question, then, is how the good entrepreneur might convince the lender 
of  his true type.  This issue is addressed in the next section. 
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The reorganization payoffs to the entrepreneur and the lender, as defined in (2) and (3) 
above,  merely  specify  the  expected  value  each  class  of  claimants  will  receive from  any 
equilibrium plan of  reorganization.  They do not, however,  specify the form  in which  these 
payments.  are distributed. As will be seen below, the good entrepreneur can use the form of these 
payments to signal his firm's type, allowing him to receive a different expected return than the 
entrepreneur of  the bad firm. 
One common structure for reorganization payments is for the firm to cancel its existing 
debt and stock and issue new equity to the claimants.  We will call this kind of  reorganization 
a stock reorganization.  The entrepreneur's expected return from a stock reorganization is 
while the lender's expected return is 
where o is the share of  the reorganized firm controlled by  the entrepreneur, and F is again the 
appropriate distribution function of i2  given the lender's beliefs about the firm's type (which in 
equilibrium must equal the true distribution of  i2). By  the discussion in the previous section, 
we know that these payoffs must equal the expected returns defined in (3) and (2), respectively. 
We can use this fact to determine the fraction of  the new  stock given to the entrepreneur in an 
equilibrium plan of reorganization: 
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minimum expected return, as defined in (2). 
The share of the reorganized firm's equity to be given to the entrepreneur clearly depends 
on the lender's beliefs about the firm's type.  If the firm were good and the entrepreneur could 
convince the lender of this fact, he could bargain for more of  the reorganized firm's stock and, 
hence, earn a higher expected return.  Nevertheless, a separating equilibrium does not exist in 
which the good firm offers stock to its creditors. 
PROPOS~~ION  1.2:  The  unique  equilibrium  of  the  reorganization  game  using  only  stock 
distributions is a pooling equilibrium; a separating equilibrium does not exist. 
Proof:  Suppose the good firm were to separate and distribute stock to its creditors; let o,  be the 
proportion of the firm's new stock going to the entrepreneur when the firm is known to be good. 
By  definition,  this  value  ensures  that  the  entrepreneur  receives  an  expected  return  of 
c  + f  (x2-h) dG(x2), as long as the lender believes the fm is good.  But the entrepreneur of 
the bad firm will receive a higher expected return by mimicking this offer than by separating (by 
Proposition 1.1). As a result, the creditor will demand at least (1  -0,)  of the firm's stock, where on 
is the share of  the firm going to the entrepreneur when pooling is known to occur.  4 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9512.pdfThe intuition here is straightforward.  Since the bad  entrepreneur can mimic any offer 
made by the good one and receives a higher expected return from doing so, pooling will always 
occur.  The lender anticipates this, and the good entrepreneur is unable to reap any of the benefits 
of  his superior return distribution. 
How then might the good entrepreneur signal his firm's true nature?  One alternative is 
to offer his creditor a different bundle of  securities that, while still giving the same expected 
return to both the lender and the entrepreneur, provides for some state dependence.  Warrants 
have just these characteristics. 
Suppose the firm's entrepreneur offered the lender all of the reorganized firm, but retained 
for himself the right to buy, by paying P, a block of  stock from the firm that would give him the 
right to  a fraction of  the firm's revenues, o. More concisely  stated, the entrepreneur gives 
himself warrants with strike price P which, if exercised, would  give him o  of  the firm.  To 
ensure that these warrants will be exercised when and only when the value of  the firm exceeds 
W  the debt due the creditor (i.e.,  x, +x2  -  c 2 6), set P = 6 -. 
1  -w 
The expected return to the entrepreneur is then 
where  cp  = 6  + c -  x,.  To guarantee the entrepreneur the proper expected return, o  must be 
set to make this expression equal to (3): 
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It is again straightforward to show that this expected return, along with the above definition for 
o,  guarantees the lender his minimum expected return, as defined by (2). 
We now show that warrants allow for a separating equilibrium; moreover, when warrants 
and  stock are the only two  securities available in  reorganization, this separation is a unique 
equilibrium: 
PROPOS~~ION  1.3:  The  unique  equilibrium  of  the  reorganization  game  is for  the  good 
entrepreneur to ofSer a plan  that gives the entire jim  to the lender while retaining for 
himself warrants entitling him to buy oG  of  the firm for  a price  P  = 6 oG/(l  -aG), and 
for the bad entrepreneur to ofSer a stock reorganization in which he retains a fraction  o, 
of thefimz. 
Proof:  First  we  will  show  existence.  Consider  the  action  of  the  good  firm's  original  - 
shareholders.  By offering warrants, they expect to receive  c  +  (x2-A) dG(x2), whereas by  6 
Proposition 1.2, they would receive c  +  (x,-1)  dll(x2) if they offered stock.  By Proposition  6 
1.1, the original shareholders receive a higher expected return from warrants. 
Next,  consider the action of  the bad  firm's  shareholders by  comparing their expected 
return fiom issuing stock, c  +  (x,-1)  dB(x,) ,  with what they would expect to receive if they  "r 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9512.pdfmimicked  the  good  firm  and  issued  warrants, a,  (x2-cp) dB(x,);  we  will  show that  the  Ly 
difference between  the return  from  stock  and  the return  from  warrants is positive.  After 
substituting for a,,  this difference has the same sign as 
Ly  (x  h)  (x)  + c  f  (x, -1) dG(x2) + c 
This difference is minimized when G has no weight in the interval [cp, h]  ,  so we will impose this 
restriction on G for the rest of  the proof.  Thus, (11) is equal to 
Now, expression (12) has the same sign as 
which (since h  = cp  + c) is equal to 
Some simple algebra shows this is equal to 
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This implies that expression (15) is weakly larger than 
where this last  step follows from the fact that  h  = cp+c.  Since  G(h)  = G(cp)  I  B(cp),  this 
expression must be  non-negative,  implying that  expression  (11)  is non-negative -  i.e.,  the 
entrepreneur of  the bad firm will not wish to mimic the good fm's warrant offer. 
Finally, consider the actions of  the lender.  Since full separation is occurring, it is an 
equilibrium action for him to accept the offers of  both the good firm and the bad h,  and to 
believe that the good firm is offering warrants while the bad firm is offering stock. 
The only other possible equilibrium is for the bad entrepreneur to separate by  offering 
warrants.  But this cannot be an equilibrium, since the good entrepreneur would wish to mimic 
this offer (this follows from the fact that a,  > a,, i.e., that expression [Ill is positive).  This 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9512.pdfproves uniqueness.  4 
Why does the entrepreneur of  the bad firm mimic stock offers but not warrants?  Since 
the good firm is more likely to  have high period-two profits, its entrepreneur needs a smaller 
percentage of the firm to earn his minimum expected return than does the entrepreneur of the bad 
firm.  This also explains why the good entrepreneur would mimic a warrant offer made by  the 
bad firm:  If he could get a larger fraction of the firm he would take it, even though he doesn't 
need it to earn his minimum expected return. 
4.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  we  have  shown  that  firms with  good  future prospects  will  propose 
reorganization plans  in  which  any  value  given  to  the  firm's  original  shareholders  will  be 
distributed in the form of warrants.  This is because the state-dependent  nature of the payoff from 
warrants allows these firms to credibly  signal their true type. 
In this model, separation of  good and bad fms  occurs because the payoff fi-om  warrants 
is state dependent.  Given this, it is reasonable to wonder whether direct call options, with their 
more simple structure, might provide a better signal of  the firm's type.  In particular, one might 
imagine a plan of  reorganization that allocates all of the firm's stock to its creditors, but gives 
the original shareholders the option to buy this stock from the creditors at some future date (as 
opposed to warrants, where the new  stock is issued by  the firm).  This type of reorganization 
plan would look much like the bankruptcy processes proposed by Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion, 
Hart, and Moore (1992). 
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control, and if this effort affects the firm's future profitability, a pure stock option would give 
them little incentive to increase the value of  the fm. Working hard would increase the chance 
that the firm's original stockholders could exercise their option.  In contrast, warrants allow the 
firm's original creditors to share in the upside gain during high-profitability states, no matter how 
large it is. 
Of  course, there are several important caveats to this analysis.  First, it assumes that the 
managers of the firm are perfect representatives of its original shareholders. Betker (1995) argues 
that the reorganization process can sometimes cause the firm's managers to have an incentive to 
work in the interests of the firm's creditors (who will become its owners after the reorganization 
is completed).  Nevertheless, he does find that when a large portion of the CEO's compensation 
is in the form of  stock,  his  or  her  interests  are, in  fact, closely  aligned with  those  of  the 
shareholders. 
This paper also has nothing to say about the relative efficiency of the outcomes presented. 
From an  ex-ante standpoint (that is, when the firm initially incurs its debts and  invests in a 
project), the expected magnitude of  any anticipated APR deviation in bankruptcy is unaffected 
by the form this deviation might take. 
The results developed here offer some easily testable empirical implications. Future work 
will look at the stock prices of  firms that have emerged from Chapter 11 reorganization.  The 
model in this paper suggests that the stock prices of  firms whose reorganization plans issued 
warrants to their original shareholders should be higher than those of fms  whose reorganization 
plans used only stock or cash. 
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